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I - Introduction12 
 
Recent discussion in Australia in respect of insolvency has focussed on the 
role of the law in encouraging innovation. Concern has been expressed for 
some time about the effectiveness of the voluntary administration regime in 
terms of providing an effective and efficient means of saving companies in 
financial distress. Although most often comparisons have been made with the 
bankruptcy regime in the United States, it is worthwhile considering also the 
position in the United Kingdom. That jurisdiction’s regime not only has 
provided the heritage for current Australian law but it also provides a point of 
comparison given the institutional and regulatory similarities. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the modern law relating to both personal and 
corporate insolvency is currently contained in the Insolvency Act 1986.3 
Although of some vintage now, the IA 1986 was the governmental response to 
the report and recommendations of a multi-disciplinary committee tasked with 
reviewing insolvency law and practice in the late 1970s.4 The Cork Report 
influenced the implementation of the IA 1986, which brought together in one 
statute both personal bankruptcy and corporate insolvency and at the same 
time effected a radical reconstruction of the law relating to all forms of 
insolvency, including the introduction of the concept of corporate rescue 
through the use of two new procedures: the corporate voluntary arrangement5 
and administration. During the early years following the passage of the IA 
                                                     
1 This paper is based on a presentation titled “Corporate Rescue in the UK: Ten Years after 
the Enterprise Act 2002 Reforms”, given by Paul Omar to the Colloquium on “Benchmarking 
Voluntary Administration on its 20-Year Anniversary” organised by the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Law Scholarship Unit at the Adelaide Law School, Adelaide, Australia on 26 July 
2013. Paul wishes to thank Professors David Brown and Christopher Symes for the kind 
invitation to address the colloquium and the members of the audience for the number of 
useful criticisms and feedback they have provided. Paul also wishes to note the assistance of 
Jennifer Gant in helping to finalise this paper, for which a co-author credit is well deserved. 
Any errors or omissions remain, however, Paul’s own. 
2 A portion of this introduction was taken from Chapter 4 of Jennifer Gant’s PhD Thesis, titled 
“Rescue Before a Fall: an Anglo-French Analysis of the Balance between Business Rescue 
and Employment Protection in the UK and France”, submitted at the Nottingham Law School 
in January 2016. 
3 Insolvency Act 1986 (1986 c. 45) (“IA 1986”). 
4 K. Cork, Sir (Chairman), Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee 
(Cmnd. 8558) (HMSO, 1982) (“Cork Report”). 
5 Commonly referred to by its acronym: “CVA”. 
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1986, a number of issues were observed relating to the underutilisation of the 
new procedures in comparison to receivership, which was often preferred by 
principal creditors. This led to reforms at the turn of the millennium with the 
aim of making the rescue procedures more efficient and beneficial to all 
manner of debtors and providing greater benefits to unsecured creditors. 
 
The reforms, though enacted through the Insolvency Act 2000 and Enterprise 
Act 2002,6 were brought into force at the same time over 2003-2004, 
constituting a radical change to almost every part of the insolvency 
framework. The two texts have not been the end of reforms, however, nor 
should they be. As the effects of globalisation and recession have affected 
business practices and regulation over the period since the promulgation of 
the reforms, so too must insolvency systems evolve to meet the changing 
paradigm of economic recovery. In so doing, modern insolvency systems with 
effective forms of corporate rescue can play their part in recovering from the 
financial crisis by helping to create an environment where business failure and 
associated unemployment can be mitigated. This article seeks to chart the 
direction of reforms in the post-2003 era and to offer, in light of the analysis of 
the success (or otherwise) of these reforms, a prediction of the future direction 
of the law. 
 
II – The Cork Era 
 
A Time before Cork 
 
27 January 1977 is the key date in the history of insolvency law in the United 
Kingdom. It was on this day that an interdisciplinary committee7 was formed, 
presided over by Kenneth Cork (who later became Sir Kenneth Cork).8 The 
committee’s task was to report on the state of insolvency law in the United 
Kingdom and to propose recommendations for its improvement by way of 
legislative reform. Before delving into the outcomes of the Cork Committee, 
there are some preliminary observations worthy of note. Sir Kenneth Cork’s 
father was engaged in the accountancy profession, a career also undertaken 
by his son, who founded an accountancy firm Cork Gully (still existing in 
practice) in the 1960s. The firm’s primary activity was, apart from the 
incidental provision of accountancy services to clients, the restructuring of 
enterprises and negotiation of deeds of arrangement between a debtor 
company and its creditors. These deeds of arrangement had the aim of 
contractually binding parties to a debt settlement agreement.9 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the insolvency of a company would normally 
lead to the appointment by the main secured creditor of a firm of accountants 
with the task of recovering debts through receivership, a procedure created 
sometime in the 18th century and which was based on an old equitable 
                                                     
6 Insolvency Act 2000 (2000 c. 39) (“IA 2000”); Enterprise Act 2002 (2002 c. 40) (“EA 2002”). 
7 Commonly referred to as the “Cork Committee”. 
8 The title was conferred on Sir Kenneth during his tenure as Lord Mayor of London in 1978-
79 at the same time as his presidency of the committee. 
9 The history of the firm and its most prominent clients is discussed in Sir Kenneth Cork’s 
excellent autobiography, titled Cork on Cork (Macmillan, 1988). 
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remedy in real property law. The receivership procedure was seen as a 
means whereby a creditor benefitting from a debt secured under a floating 
charge could appoint a receiver to take control of the assets subject to the 
security, effectively taking control of the company. The receiver’s primary 
objective was to realise his client’s security by applying funds released in the 
liquidation of an equivalent value of assets of the debtor company.10 A 
receiver’s fundamental role was to do his utmost to assure the settlement of 
the company’s debts in this way. Once the receiver had completed his task, 
the directors then resumed control of the enterprise in whatever state it was 
in. Companies rarely survived this procedure, as its aim was to maximise 
returns to creditors, in particular the principal creditor holding the floating 
charge, rather than having any concern for the survival of the company. At 
that time, insolvency work was normally provided by accountants, although 
there were some solicitors who provided advice to clients about how to avoid 
worst case scenarios and their legal consequences. There was however, no 
regulated profession of insolvency practitioners in the United Kingdom as 
there had been in France since 1967. 
 
While the United Kingdom insolvency system was not completely obsolete at 
the time that the Cork Committee was formed, the system as it existed was 
not adapted to the needs of modern business. With the exception of some 
small alterations, the law had not been the object of any serious revision for a 
number of years. The law on personal bankruptcy was still governed by the 
Bankruptcy Act 1914,11 applying only to England and Wales. Scotland and 
Northern Ireland had their own personal bankruptcy regimes, though there 
were significant similarities between the three systems. Corporate insolvency 
was governed by a unified regime under the Companies Act 1948,12 applying 
to the entirety of the United Kingdom. This Act provided procedures for 
voluntary liquidation initiated by the company and/or its shareholders as well 
as an involuntary liquidation initiated by creditors.13 There was also a 
procedure available whereby a compromise or arrangement could be made 
between the company and its creditors, in similar form to the informal deed of 
arrangement and a precursor to the modern Scheme of Arrangement.14 There 
was, however, nothing akin to procedures aimed at corporate recovery or 
rehabilitation that had been adopted elsewhere. Some early models are 
known, such as judicial management in the South African Companies Act 
1926,15 redressement judiciaire in the French Decree of 20 May 1955,16 later 
replaced by the Law of 13 July 196717 or the Australian procedure of judicial 
management, introduced in 1961. Growing consciousness of the need for a 
rescue-oriented procedure meant, however, that the advent in 1978 of the 
                                                     
10 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), at 20. 
11 Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V c. 59). For an insight into the development of 
insolvency, especially in the formative period of the 19th century, see V. Lester, Victorian 
Insolvency (Oxford University Press, 1995). 
12 Companies Act 1948 (1948 c. 38). 
13 Ibid., Part V. 
14 Found today in the Companies Act 2006 (2006 c. 46), sections 895-901. 
15 Companies Act (Act no. 46 of 1926). 
16 Decree no. 55-583 of 20 May 1955. 
17 Law no. 67-563 of 13 July 1967. 
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best known recovery model in the form of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
of the United States (“Chapter 11”) greatly interested the Cork Committee, as 
the debate in anticipation of its creation and subsequent enactment coincided 
with the beginning of the committee’s deliberations.18 
 
Demand for Reform: the Raison d’être of the Cork Committee 
 
Apart from the relative void of a modern bankruptcy and insolvency system, 
the reason for the formation of the Cork Committee was above all due to the 
serious economic situation in the 1970s. In retrospect, the crisis of the 1970s, 
in the wake of rising petrol prices, political uncertainty and serious industrial 
conflicts, was one of the most significant for the survival of the country, more 
so than was the crisis of the 1990s or indeed the recent global financial crisis 
beginning in 2008, whose consequences are still being felt today. This 
financial crisis, like many others, was precipitated by a housing bubble. Just 
before the crisis of the 1970s, companies in certain sectors had continued to 
experience growth, particularly in the construction industry, a factor that 
suggested that perhaps the country’s economy was indeed strong enough to 
survive the frequent regime changes (and consequent shifts in economic 
policy) between the Labour and Conservative Parties that had occurred 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.  
 
In 1972, however, during the hearing of the bankruptcy of John Poulson, a 
well-known architect, the Government was implicated in a scandal in which 
Poulson was accused of bribing and corrupting local councillors, officials and 
civil servants in order to win construction contracts in cities throughout the 
country. The scandal went to the heart of the government as it emerged that 
the then Home Secretary Reginald Maudling was involved in Poulson’s 
business. Maudling was forced to resign from government when it emerged 
that he had joined the boards of three of Poulson’s companies between 1967 
and 1969, for which his compensation was a large annual covenant in favour 
of his wife’s charitable project, the Adeline Genée Theatre. Maudling was 
accused of receiving Poulson’s “gifts” at his hearing, these being viewed by 
the court as corrupt payments.19 
 
This scandalous episode illuminated the then common corrupt business 
practices and overall absence of an ethical code in the business world, along 
with the resulting inadequacy of consumer protection.20 The “phoenix 
syndrome” thrived off the fraudulent sales of companies by directors complicit 
with liquidators in a cyclical process of company creation in anticipation of 
their failure, the purpose of which was personal enrichment to the 
disadvantage of company creditors.21 Even the most reputed accountants 
managing the accounts of large respected companies in receivership were 
                                                     
18 For a comparative contextual history behind the adoption of Chapter 11 and the IA 1986, 
see B. Carruthers and T. Halliday, Rescuing Business (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
19 J. Tribe, “The Poulson Affair: Corruption and the Role of Bankruptcy Law Public 
Examinations in the Early 1970s” (2010) 21 Kings Law Journal 495, at 499, 501 and 503. 
20 Even as recently as 2009, the Farepak scandal saw small investors who put small sums 
throughout the year aside in order to save for their Christmas festivities, lose all of their 
savings. 
21 Finch, above note 10, at 174. 
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viewed unfavourably. The perception was that they did not care about the 
position of employees, entrepreneurs, who were subject to extremely high 
(even punitive) taxation rates in the 1970s, or indeed other stakeholders who 
could potentially be adversely affected by a receivership (inevitably followed 
by a liquidation) in favour of a principal creditor. Given that the profession was 
not well organised and that only the members of regulated accountancy firms 
generally had a professional status subject to ethical guidelines, “cowboy”22 
liquidators existed who would take hold of small businesses and enrich 
themselves by selling the assets of the company under their care in return for 
commission. Some of these cowboys even stalked companies that they knew 
were struggling financially, offering them a form of contrived liquidation with 
the aim of enriching themselves with the funds released from asset sales at 
the expense of the company and its creditors. 
 
After numerous revelations into the disgraceful state of business ethics (or 
lack thereof) in the press, there were demands for reforms. Many accountants 
and liquidators believed that a reform to the law was necessary in order to 
sanitise their tarnished professional reputation. They were driven to call for the 
formation of an organisation that could represent the entire profession. Thus, 
the Insolvency Practitioners Association (“IPA”), originally founded in 1961, 
was revived in order to create a forum within which practitioners could debate 
the problems confronting them in practice. It was not, however, the only (or 
indeed official) body representing practitioners to the Government. It was 
against the background of scandal and concern for the effects on consumers 
that the Labour Government of the day initiated the formation of the Cork 
Committee in 1977. Other concerns included the lack of regulation and 
associated destruction of the reputation of the professionals involved. Such 
was the need for change that the Government was motivated to act at the 
insistence of both professionals and their clients, as well as the trade unions. 
The change in government two years later did not undermine the objective set 
for the Cork Committee, as the Conservatives shared the ambition of reviving 
the economy and strengthening the business sector. They too recognised that 
reforms in the area of insolvency law would assist in attaining this objective. 
 
The Work of the Cork Committee 
 
Like many committees charged with a specific mandate, the Cork Committee 
included non-governmental representatives, including lawyers (notably Muir 
Hunter QC, who had played a role in the Poulson affair as Crown Prosecutor), 
a former trade unionist, a banker, the director of a large corporation, the 
secretary of a cooperative association (representing consumers) as well as 
two judges. Curiously, the Cork Committee included only one accountant: Sir 
Kenneth Cork himself. However, it was also assisted by two working groups 
constituted by professionals, notably of accountants and academics. The work 
of the Cork Committee was thus not only emblazoned with the hallmark of 
neutrality, but was also rich in the solid practical experience necessary for 
creating a practical framework for reform. Its work resulted in the publication 
of an intermediate report and a principal report on the reform needs for 
                                                     
22 Also known as “ambulance chasers”, a practice first highlighted in the United States. 
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national law, the latter appearing in 1982. Sir Kenneth Cork had, of course, 
some experience in the development of proposals for reform as he had also 
contributed to the 1976 Report on the Draft EEC Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings with regard to the implications for its adoption by the United 
Kingdom.23 
 
The report of 1982 was long and exhaustive, even to the point of containing, 
according to hearsay, a chapter on “extra-terrestrial insolvency”, fortunately 
absent from the final report. There were literally hundreds of 
recommendations included in its text. The Cork Committee had reviewed 
national law in the light of comparative law, referring to many examples of 
developments elsewhere, including those that provided for a new “rescue 
culture” that had been highlighted by the implementation of Chapter 11 in the 
United States. Because of the level of detail in the report, which commented 
on the law and also gave a historical perspective on its evolution, it quickly 
acquired a near-mythic status. It became the source of inspiration for 
numerous reform committees throughout the world, such as the Harmer 
Committee that reviewed the law in Australia in 1988. Even today, it is quite 
normal to refer to the contents of the Cork Report in discussions on insolvency 
law reform. 
 
A positive response from government to the recommendations of the Cork 
Report came during the 1984-85 parliamentary session when the opportunity 
came for the rapid adoption of a text that would accompany the concomitant 
overhaul of company law. In fact, both pieces of legislation: the Companies 
Act 198524 and the Insolvency Act 198525 were adopted within the same 
Parliamentary session. The latter text, however, was not on the statute book 
for long, being quickly replaced by a new version, the IA 1986, which 
constituted a quasi-reordering of the insolvency provisions of both texts. The 
1986 text thus gathered together the collective insolvency procedures recently 
introduced into law as well as the liquidation procedures set out in the 
Companies Act 1985. The IA 1986 also constituted the codification of 
corporate insolvency law and personal bankruptcy together (including the 
English and Scottish procedures pertaining to individuals). However, it was 
only following the adoption of the Scotland Act 1998 and the devolution of 
power to the new parliament in Edinburgh that Scotland began to overhaul its 
own personal insolvency regime.26 Today, corporate insolvency procedures 
remain reserved to the Parliament in London, until such time that Scotland is 
able to gain independence, of course. 
 
The Results of the Cork Report and the Rescue Dynamic 
                                                     
23 Report of the Advisory Committee on the EEC Draft Bankruptcy Convention (Cmnd. 6602) 
(HMSO, 1976). The convention was adopted in 1995 but never entered into force. Its terms 
were substantially replicated in the European Insolvency Regulation (EU Regulation No. 1346 
of 2002) (“EIR”), itself recently reformed in 2015 (EU Regulation No. 2015/848) (“Recast 
EIR”). 
24 Companies Act 1985 (1985 c. 6). 
25 Insolvency Act 1985 (1985 c. 65). 
26 D. McKenzie Skene, “Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est La Même Chose? The Reform of 




It was the conclusion of the Cork Report that the United Kingdom insolvency 
system lacked any real method for rescuing companies in financial difficulties. 
While true that there were some procedures in existence that might meet 
some of the objectives of rescue, they were admittedly not fit for modern 
purposes and the fundamental aims of corporate rescue. Receivership, which 
could be used to reorganise companies, did not guarantee rescue, rather the 
majority of procedures resulted in the consignment of companies to oblivion. 
The Cork Committee also considered that the receivership procedure was of 
limited use as it required the prior existence of a floating charge in order to 
appoint a receiver. Some companies could be saved under the scheme of 
arrangement process available in the Companies Act 1948 (and its later 
successors of 1985 and 2006),27 but this procedure was time-consuming, 
requiring the involvement of specialists, the preparation of meticulous (and 
costly) documentation as well as a minimum of two court dates. Furthermore, 
at the time, it was felt that the scheme procedure was not designed for 
businesses at the threshold of insolvency.28 
 
As such, the methodology of the Cork Committee was to embark on a 
comparative analysis to draw inspiration from the experience in a number of 
different jurisdictions which had, by then, implemented procedures with the 
aim of providing mechanisms by which companies could be rescued. As 
examples of this process, the Cork Committee pointed to Chapter 11 in the 
United States, which procedure was the perceived forerunner of corporate 
rescue. It was seen as providing a broad and flexible mechanism with nearly 
limitless possibilities for the reorganisation and ultimate rescue of the debtor 
company. The debtor remained in possession of the company and a stay was 
established to disallow the issue of any claims on the company assets. The 
final objective of a Chapter 11 procedure was stated as being the creation and 
approval of a plan agreed with the debtor’s creditors to modify and restructure 
the debtor’s obligations and, if appropriate, to grant the debtor a discharge.29 
However, though the Chapter 11 model was quite seductive to those tasked 
with reforming British insolvency law, it incorporated a practice that the United 
Kingdom did not wish to copy: it left the debtor in charge of its business rather 
than replacing him with an official of some description. The “debtor in 
possession” model was generally unacceptable to the British perspective on 
insolvency because of the distrust it was thought likely to engender.30 
 
Other jurisdictions were also considered. In fact, despite the place of honour 
often granted to the United States for its innovative rescue regime, importantly 
for European considerations, France was actually the first to embrace rescue. 
The reforms in the Law of 1967 introduced a procedure of judicial settlement 
                                                     
27 Companies Act 1985, sections 425-427 (now Companies Act 2006, sections 994-996). 
28 Recent practice, certainly since Re Drax Holdings Ltd; Re Inpower Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 10, 
appears to sanction the use of schemes close to, if not over, the insolvency threshold. 
29 O. Lobo (ed), World Insolvency Systems: A Comparative Study (Thompson Reuters, 2009), 
at 693-800. 
30 Chapter 11 as a model has never entirely gone away from the reformists’ psyche, for which 
see J. Tribe, “The Extension of Small Company Voluntary Arrangements: A Response to the 
Conservative Party’s Corporate Restructuring Proposals”, Chapter 8 in P. Omar (ed), 
International Insolvency Law: Reforms and Challenges (Ashgate, 2013) (193-228). 
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that provided for a composition with creditors that allowed the company to 
continue to function. It was, however, a court led procedure, a feature which 
distinguished it from the American regime.31 South Africa had also had 
reorganisation procedures in place since the Companies Act 1973 (the 
legislative successor to the 1926 forerunner), which provided a mechanism for 
corporate reorganisation by which company debt could be compromised with 
creditors and/or a moratorium on enforcement put in place. The text gave a 
number of options through which a reorganisation might be achieved.32 The 
observed experience of these procedures among a variety of jurisdictions, 
reflected in the Cork Report, showed that rescue could be a viable proposition 
for quite a few companies. 
 




The IA 1986 embraced the objective of promoting recovery by the introduction 
of two new rescue procedures: the CVA, covering companies prior to formal 
insolvency, and administration for companies closer to insolvency. In its 
deliberations over how to approach corporate rescue from a United Kingdom 
perspective, although the Cork Committee considered a number of pre-
existing procedures as examples of regimes that they might wish to emulate in 
some way, the inspiration for the two new recovery procedures were found in 
models that already existed within the law. Thus, the structural foundations for 
the CVA and administration were found respectively in a simplified and 
stripped down version of the scheme of arrangement and receivership. 
Nonetheless, there was also a conceptual difference between the two 
procedures: the CVA attempted to provide a framework for the type of debtor-
creditor negotiation that was similar to an informal workout, while 
administration was more formal a process directed by an administrator under 
the overall supervision of the court. Both procedures lay on a path of 
increasing formality, with the CVA upstream and administration further 
downstream. In addition, unlike receivership, administration was in nature a 
collective procedure, thus serving the interests of all creditors, both secured 
and unsecured, rather than just the principal secured creditor. Rejecting the 
debtor-in-possession model, what the two procedures had in common was the 
fact that, though the right of initiation could rest with the debtor, they were 




                                                     
31 A. Sorenson and P. Omar, Corporate Rescue Procedures in France (Kluwer Law, 1996), at 
24-26. 
32 See South African Companies Act (Act 61 of 1973), section 311 for the scheme of 
compromise and sections 427-440 for judicial management, both of which can function as 
reorganisation procedures. These were also said to be the inspiration for the procedure 
known as Official Management appearing in the Australian Uniform Companies Acts 1961. 
33 Please note that reference in this section to the IA 1986 is to the version prior to the 
enactment of the IA 2000 and EA 2002. 
34 IA 1986, Part I (sections 1-6). 
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The Cork Report stated that its intention with regard to the CVA procedure 
was that it should be an inexpensive, quick and efficient method of dealing 
with financial difficulties without engaging in formal procedures.35 It centred on 
companies dealing with creditors and negotiating terms with them under the 
guidance of an insolvency practitioner, arriving at an agreement in 
compromise through which debts could be settled and the company could 
survive. The CVA often involved a partial waiver of the debts due with a 
rescheduling of repayments. The CVA was available to the directors of a 
company that was in financial difficulty, but was not necessarily insolvent. 
Directors could apply to the court for the approval of CVA proposals.36 The 
objective of the proposals submitted to the court had to be a compromise or 
settlement of claims by creditors. A qualified insolvency practitioner had to be 
nominated to oversee the arrangement37 and to provide a report within 28 
days to the court containing the proposals of the CVA and whether or not he 
believed it should be put to shareholders and creditors.38 The court could then 
give permission to summon meetings with shareholders and creditors in order 
to consider the terms of the arrangement.39 However, proposals that affected 
preferential or secured creditors could not be considered without the express 
consent of those affected.40 In the event that the plan was accepted by the 
requisite majority, it could then be imposed upon all creditors, whether 
signatories to the plan or not.41 However, challenges could also be brought by 
shareholders or creditors on the grounds that the CVA unfairly prejudiced their 
interests or that there had been some material irregularity in the meetings.42 
The practitioner also had the duty to oversee the debtor during the execution 
of the recovery plan, though the duration of the practitioner’s oversight was 




The Cork Report had emphasised the need for a new rescue procedure that 
would allow the business to continue, thus preserving employment, trading 
and the generation of profits, as well as the eventual satisfaction of most of 
the company’s creditors.44 This ethos resulted in the second rescue 
procedure, administration, which was more formal and introduced a 
suspension of debt enforcement proceedings under the protection of a 
moratorium. The administration procedure required that it would lead to one of 
four possible outcomes, specified in the administration order, though there 
was no hierarchy or priority applied to these objectives. The outcomes 
included the survival of the company or a part of it as a going concern;45 the 
                                                     
35 Cork Report, at paragraph 204. 
36 IA 1986, section 1(1). 
37 Ibid, section 1(2). 
38 Ibid, section 2(2); Insolvency Rules 1986, rule 1.7. 
39 Ibid, section 3. 
40 Ibid, section 4(3)-(4). 
41 Otherwise known as a “cram-down” (ibid. section 5). 
42 Ibid., section 6. 
43 Ibid., sections 8-27 (Part II). 
44 Cork Report, in Chapter 9. 
45 IA 1986, section 8(3)(a). 
 10
approval of a CVA;46 the sanctioning of a scheme of arrangement;47 or for 
some more advantageous realisation of the company’s property than might be 
attained in a straight liquidation.48 Administration was viewed as leading 
somewhere, not just to the company being rescued but also, because the 
administrator undertook the management of the company, to some other 
potentially rehabilitative procedure being successfully implemented. 
 
The production of a report by the administrator was usual to help the court 
decide whether an administration order should be granted.49 The application 
for an order was then made by company, directors or creditors.50 The effect of 
the order was to introduce a moratorium with any administrative receivers 
being required to vacate office.51 Upon the granting of the order, a qualified 
insolvency practitioner would be appointed as administrator,52 endowed with 
wide powers53 to investigate and ascertain the company’s affairs.54 The 
administrator took managerial control of the company and dealt with its assets 
as he saw necessary to the performance of his duty. The administrator was 
required to publish a statement of his proposals55 to be considered at a 
creditors’ meeting.56 Creditors were also entitled to information from the 
administrator through a creditors’ committee until they were eventually 
presented with the recovery plan.57 Although the adoption of the recovery plan 
was normally approved during a meeting called by the administrator, 
dissenting shareholders or creditors could seek remedies in court in the event 
that they perceived that they had suffered unfair prejudice in the plan.58 The 
implementation of the recovery plan generally led to the administrator selling 
the whole of the business or as individual business units as a going concern 
with the shell (plus any remainder) being wound up, following which the 
administrator was discharged.59 
 
Changes in Practice, Profession and Ethics 
 
The global modernisation of insolvency systems, represented by the 
introduction of the CVA and administration procedures, was not the only 
modern feature of insolvency law introduced by legislation at this time. It was 
also accompanied by a new ethical awareness in the business world. Thus, 
accompanying the IA 1986 was a new regime targeting directors who had 
contributed to the failure of the companies for which they were responsible. 
                                                     
46 Ibid, section 8(3)(b). 
47 Ibid, section 8(3)(c), the scheme being one under Companies Act 1985, section 425 (now 
Companies Act 2006, section 895). 
48 Ibid, section 8(3)(d). 
49 Insolvency Rules 1986, rule 2.2. 
50 IA 1986, section 9. 
51 Ibid, section 11. 
52 Ibid, section 13. 
53 Ibid, sections 14-17. 
54 Ibid, sections 21-22. 
55 Ibid, section 23. 
56 Ibid, section 24. 
57 Ibid, section 26. 
58 Ibid, section 27, similar in function to the procedure available under Companies Act 1985, 
section 459 (now Companies Act 2006, section 994). 
59 Ibid., section 18. 
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The Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 198660 provided for sanctions 
applicable to directors who had failed in their duties with the possibility of 
disqualifying them from company directorship for a period of time, depending 
on the severity of their negligence or wrong doing. The moralisation of the day 
also led to an overhaul of the profession of insolvency practitioners and the 
creation of an interface between the government and the industry in order to 
address issues relating to the structure of the profession and its ethical 
guidelines. Given the diverse professions practicing in the field of insolvency 
and the idiosyncratic constitution of the field, it was governed by seven 
different professional associations,61 which are described as Recognised 
Professional Bodies (“RPBs”) and are tasked by the Secretary of State to 
issue licenses to practitioners falling within their remit. An eighth organisation, 
the Association of Business Recovery Professionals62 is an umbrella 
organisation that groups together the other seven RPBs and acts as an 
intermediary with the government and other public powers. The mechanism of 
interface between the government and the profession is normally provided by 
the Joint Insolvency Committee (“JIC”) (composed of representatives of the 
seven other organisations) under the authority of the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills (“DBIS”), specifically through the agency of the 
Insolvency Service. It is the JIC that is consulted prior to the adoption of 
insolvency regulations and which adopts the common standards for 
insolvency law practitioners,63 although individual practitioners are still 
governed by the rules of their own professional associations. The operation of 
the JIC and the process through which the profession is regulated are 
intended to occur by consensus; the government does not intervene to 
legislate unless there are exceptional reasons for so doing.64 
 




There were a number of issues that conspired to avoid large scale resort to 
the new rescue procedures following their introduction in the IA 1986. It would 
not be until additional reforms were undertaken at the turn of the millennium 
that either of the rescue procedures would experience a significant increase in 
their popularity. There are several reasons that can be advanced to justify the 
                                                     
60 Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986 (1986 c. 46). 
61 The 7 RPBs are: (1) The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants; (2) The 
Insolvency Practitioner Association; (3)-(5) The Institute of Chartered Accountants of three 
different countries: England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland; and (6)-(7) The Law Society of 
both England and Wales and Scotland. There are also the “official receivers”, who work for 
the Insolvency Service and whose business is to oversee insolvency proceedings where there 
is (as yet) no appointed insolvency practitioner. They are expected to comply with the same 
rules and professional practices as any other insolvency practitioner. 
62 Commonly referred to as “R3”. 
63 These are contained in various Statements of Insolvency Practice and “Dear IP” letters that 
notify practitioners of changes to the law. The standards and notifications are prepared by R3 
and adopted by the JIC. They do not carry the force of law, but any infractions can be taken 
into account in the event of professional sanctions. 
64 Unless, of course, such intervention relates to the abolition of receivership. The exception 
does not prove the rule. Interestingly, the same question has arisen more recently in the 
context of the regulation of pre-packs. 
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optimism that occurred upon the entry into force of the IA 1986 and the reality 
of the use in practice of the procedures it contained. Both rescue procedures 
had certain advantages and disadvantages affecting their perceived 




The simplicity of the CVA framework was viewed in avoiding a formal 
insolvency that would otherwise consume the assets of the company. It had 
the potential to benefit all creditors, regardless of whether or not their debts 
had been reduced in the compromise, instead of just a single secured creditor 
profiting from receivership and causing detriment to the collective of creditors. 
The procedure was also more favourable to debtors, albeit later leading to 
creditor contempt for it. As a debtor-friendly procedure, it encouraged 
companies to seek help at an earlier stage and, as a recovery procedure, it 
could provide a catalyst for management changes that would further assist in 
the recovery of the company. 
 
There were, however, also a number of disadvantages attached to the 
procedure, highlighted in a report published by the Insolvency Service in 
1993,65 which noted several barriers to its use. The lack of a moratorium 
made ensuring successful negotiations difficult. There were also problems 
associated with financial support for the restructuring of the debtor company. 
Creditors often preferred to appoint a receiver, which kept them in control of 
the situation. It was also underutilised as there was uncertainty with regard to 
what might happen if the company defaulted following the CVA with a worry 
that creditors might find themselves in a less favourable position. Creditors 
might also be required to give significant waivers or concessions, though it 
could also be argued that this was better than the alternative, given 
distributions tended to be significantly reduced in liquidation. It was also 
crucial that secured creditors lent their support for the CVA, as, in the event 
that their benefits were affected, they could impede the entire process. Finally, 
it was a time-consuming procedure, during which a creditor could still petition 
for liquidation, although this has now changed following the reforms in the IA 
2000 and the availability of a moratorium on creditor claims. These 
disadvantages offer an explanation as to why the CVA was underutilised 
initially, leading instead to the new administration procedure becoming more 




Administration presented a number of advantageous characteristics. It was 
collective in nature, orientated toward rescue and facilitated attempts to 
restructure a company. Administration was a secure court-supervised 
framework that would benefit all creditors and avoid the ravages cause by a 
secured creditor’s single minded recovery of assets. It was debtor-friendly, 
encouraging companies to seek assistance at an early stage of financial 
distress. It also had the potential of avoiding the bad publicity associated with 
                                                     
65 Company Voluntary Arrangements and Administration Orders: A Consultative Document, 
(Insolvency Service, October 1993). 
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receiverships by promoting rescue as a joint effort between the debtor and its 
creditors, rather than forming a part of the reputational problem associated 
with banks and the lending culture that had become the subject of great 
criticism. However, there was a notable lack of hierarchy among the 
objectives set out in section 8(3) of the IA 1986, where recovery is only set out 
as a potential objective equally relevant among several others, leading one to 
believe that the procedure was not truly oriented toward the rescue of 
businesses. It was also expensive due to the costs of the court supervision, 
the required reports and the involvement of an insolvency practitioner. As 
such, it was not necessarily that beneficial for small companies. Finally, the 
floating charge holder could block the appointment of an administrator in this 
early form of administration, though today, as administrative receivership has 
been largely abolished, a qualifying floating charge holder can only act to 
appoint an administrator within collective proceedings. 
 
Administration vs Receivership 
 
In addition to the growing pains associated with the introduction of a totally 
new concept of corporate rescue and the implementation of the new rescue 
regime, it was in the relationship between administration and receivership that 
the ambiguities of the new procedures became evident. Administrative 
receivership had been imported into the IA 1986 based on the private law 
procedure of receivership and did not disappear until much later in the turn of 
the millennium reforms introduced by the EA 2002. However, at the time when 
the new rescue-oriented procedures were put in place, creditors naturally 
preferred a procedure that gave them privileged access to the assets of the 
debtor. Confidence in the possibility of using rescue as a natural choice from 
among the tools available to the insolvency practitioner was slow in coming. In 
fact, even though the appointment of an administrator blocked the 
continuation of a receivership procedure, the opposite was equally true. From 
the time that a principal creditor gained knowledge that its debtor or some 
other creditor of the debtor was about to apply for an administration order, it 
could launch a receivership procedure under a loan agreement containing a 
floating charge, which was quite usual for business lending of any major 
amounts. Although a moratorium was available from the moment of the 
presentation of the order, it did not prevent the appointment of a receiver 
unless the principal creditor had already consented to the opening of an 
administration procedure. In the majority of cases, receivership took 
precedence, although in practice, when a choice between the two procedures 
was possible, unsecured creditors far preferred the opening of an 
administration procedure as its moratorium provided an advantage over the 
situation of competing creditors. 
 
The aims of the new “rescue culture” were further defeated as a practice 
borrowed from receivership began to become popularly used in administration 
procedures. The practice consisted of selling the business and the debtor 
company’s saleable assets to a subsidiary of the company with the object of 
selling the useful and obligation-free subsidiary to a third company, also 
known as a “hive-down”. This technique defeated the aim of rescuing of the 
company and protecting its unsecured creditors, employees and other 
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vulnerable stakeholders in favour of the rescue only of its business or 
profitable assets with the sole benefit enjoyed by the company, its 
administrator and the third party purchaser. This solution rapidly became the 
norm in administrations, which led to the question as to what advantage in 
terms of corporate rescue the procedure presented if practitioners merely sold 
the business to realise a sum distributable to creditors instead of saving the 
company. 
 
Disappointing Results and Interim Adjustments 
 
The disadvantages and obstacle listed above in relation to the mechanisms of 
the procedures and habits within practice can explain why, during the early 
years of the rescue culture, results in the United Kingdom were disappointing. 
The CVA suffered from the absence of a moratorium and was not useful 
unless debtors acted quickly, while administration presented a clear 
disadvantage in relation to receivership from the point of view of secured 
creditors. It was only during the 1990s that these two procedures experienced 
a boom: the CVA from about 1994-95 and administration just before the turn 
of the millennium. In the table below,66 the statistics provide an overview of 
the competition between the procedures up to and beyond the time the 2000-
2002 reforms were implemented. These confirm that, prior to the reforms, 
receiverships remained in the ascendance, while rescue as a whole did not 
appear to enjoy any similar popularity. 
 
RECEIVERSHIPS, ADMINISTRATIONS AND COMPANY VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS IN ENGLAND AND 









1987  131  21 
1988  198  47 
1989  135  43 
1990  211  58 
1991 7,815 206  137 
1992 8,523 179  76 
1993 5,362 112  134 
1994 3,877 159  264 
1995 3,226 163  372 
1996 2,701 210  459 
1997 1,837 196  629 
1998 1,713 338  470 
1999 1,618 440  475 
2000 1,595 438  557 
2001 1,914 698  597 
2002 1,541 643  651 
2003 1,261 497 247 726 
2004 864 1 1,601 597 
2005 590 4 2,257 604 
2006 588 0 3,560 534 
2007 337 3 2,509 418 
2008 867 2 4,820 587 
2009 1,468 0 4,161 726 
2010 1,309  2,835 765 
2011 1,397  2,808 767 
2012 1,222  2,532 839 
2013 917  2,365 577 
2014 724  1,790 435 
2015 (Jan-Jun) 301  851 184 
                                                     
66 The data to 2011 was tabulated from statistics collected by the Insolvency Service for 
England and Wales by Dr. J Tribe (University of Kingston) and published as Table 8.1 in 
Tribe, above note 30, at 204. 
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* Shaded areas denote statistics unavailable. 
 
V- The Impetus for Change 
 
The pressure for reform grew well before the turn of the millennium. Perhaps 
in the same way as domestic company law had been placed under regular 
review since 1844 by the Department of Trade and Industry (precursor to 
DBIS),67 the Insolvency Service, also under the same Government 
department, began to look at insolvency law in the early 1990s. The 1993 
report, already mentioned,68 was, for the Insolvency Service, ample evidence 
to support claims that the procedure was under-utilised specifically because of 
the lack of a moratorium. This was underpinned by the statistics they 
collected. There was also the general disapproval by creditors, reflected in the 
report, of a procedure that, despite being under the control of a practitioner, 
seemed to be led by the debtor. This embryonic rescue model did not seem at 
all attractive, even though its company law (and more formalistic) counterpart, 
the scheme of arrangement, began to acquire an insolvency vocation, which 
has even been extended in recent practice to the restructuring of European 
businesses in financial difficulties.69 
 
Administration on the other hand, though not dealt with specifically in the 
report, was known to suffer from the lack of focus in section 8 of the IA 1986 
as to the objectives of the procedure, while also being subject to the secured 
creditors’ avowed preference for receivership. With such difficulties, one might 
be forgiven for thinking that the beginnings of the rescue culture had not 
occurred under the best auspices. The 1993 report, however, set the agenda 
for the debate on whether the rescue procedures available in the IA 1986 
needed to be better reoriented towards clearer rescue objectives. Two 
working groups were set up by the Insolvency Service to separately look at 
CVAs and administration, respectively coming up with a report in 199570 and 
2000.71 The punctuated appearance of these reports during the 1990s helped 
keep the pressure on considerations of reform up to the post-Millennium 
period, when reforms were actually undertaken. This did not mean that no 
reforms to insolvency law occurred: two statutes were passed in 199472 
effecting minor, but necessary changes, although it was clear that these were 
not intended to be by way of far-reaching reforms. 
 
                                                     
67 The legislative cycle of company law is formed by an extensive set of laws (practically 
codes given the size of the texts) adopted in 1844, 1862, 1883, 1908, 1929, 1948, 1985 and, 
most recently, in 2006. The lacuna of nearly 40 years between 1948 and 1985 can be 
explained by a project that failed due to conflict between the government and the unions. 
68 Above note 65. 
69 Recent examples include Rodenstock GmbH (2011) and Magyar Telecom BV (2013). 
70 Revised Proposals for a New Company Voluntary Arrangement Procedure: A Consultative 
Document (Insolvency Service, April 1995). 
71 Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: A Consultation 
Paper (Insolvency Service, May 2000). This was followed in short order by the White Paper, 
titled Insolvency – a Second Chance (Insolvency Service, 2001) (Cm 5234), which set out 
what was to become the EA 2002. 
72 Insolvency (Amendment) Act 1994 (1994 c. 7); Insolvency (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1994 
(1994 c. 12). 
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Adding to the debate, there was increasing awareness within the United 
Kingdom of a global shift toward the primacy of corporate rescue as a vital 
element of a mature legal and economic system. Between 1986 and 2000, a 
number of countries had been trying aspects of the rescue culture, some even 
experimenting with a number of variants of the models available. Within 
Europe, the political context contributed to the need for reform, notably in 
countries that had recently escaped from the Soviet yoke, such as 
Czechoslovakia,73 Estonia,74 Hungary,75 Latvia76 and Lithuania.77 In fact, a 
number of these jurisdictions had to reform their laws more than once, as their 
first attempts were not always able to resolve the problems of their rapidly 
evolving economies. Within the European Community (later union), reforms 
saw the light of day, not only in Germany,78 following reunification in 1990, but 
also in Finland,79 Ireland,80 Malta,81 Portugal82 and Sweden.83 The major 
reforms that occurred in France in 1994 were also part of this wave.84 One of 
the consequences of this rush to reform and wholesale adoption of the rescue 
culture, especially in projects around the Millennium, was the European 
Commission’s 2003 report, which recommended, inter alia, fresh starts for 
honest debtors and the abolition of obstacles towards rescue.85 
 
Returning to the United Kingdom, the output of the two working groups led to 
two bills, which were quickly adopted by Parliament as the IA 2000 (dealing 
essentially with the CVA, but also enabling the introduction of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997) and the EA 2002 (to cover 
reforms to administration, which took slightly longer to complete). The latter 
text was by way of being an omnibus law dealing with a number of discrete 
topics related by a business theme, hence the word “enterprise” in its title.86 
The implementation of the 2000 text was delayed so that both sets of reforms 
could enter into force together. In any event, the implementation of nearly all 
of the reforms to corporate and personal insolvency took place on different 
dates between 15 September 2003 and 1 April 2004. Both acts modified the 
IA 1986 by replacing certain of its provisions with new sections and schedules 
that were aimed at improving the rescue procedures in terms of efficiency, 
benefit and practical use. 
 
VI - Millennial Reforms and Subsequent Challenges87 
                                                     
73 Law no. 328/1991. 
74 Bankruptcy Law 1992; Commercial Code 1995. 
75 Law no. 49 of 1991. 
76 Law of 3 December 1991. 
77 Bankruptcy Law 1992. 
78 Insolvenzordnung 1990. 
79 Company Reorganisation Law 1993:47. 
80 Companies Act 1990. 
81 Companies Law 1995. 
82 Decree-Law no. 132/93 of 23 April 1993; Decree-Law no. 127/96 of 8 August 1996. 
83 Business Reorganisation Law 1996:764. 
84 Law no. 94-475 of 10 June 1994. 
85 Best Project on Restructuring, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start (September 2003). 
86 It received its Royal Assent on 7 November 2002, perhaps a truly “revolutionary” day. 
87 Space here does not permit an exhaustive rendering of the detail of the post-EA 2002 
provisions, for which recourse to one of the more established (and better) works in the field is 





The importance of the reforms can be briefly summarised. A variation of the 
CVA was created for small and medium sized enterprises that allowed for a 
moratorium at the request of the company or its directors. The administration 
procedure was simplified with a new hierarchy of objectives and an out-of-
court appointments facility was introduced. A presumption as to a maximum 
duration for administration procedures also featured in the changes. These 
reforms reflected concerns about the position of unsecured creditors, the need 
to streamline administration as a rescue tool and the importance of collective 
insolvency procedures, as opposed to private recovery methods such as the 
receivership procedure available to floating charge holders. Despite significant 
opposition from banks and other financial institutions, the primary lenders in 
the market who benefitted most from the control afforded by receivership, the 
government viewed it as being desirable to promote administration and the 
rescue culture it supported and restrict receivership. As a result, receivership 
was suppressed and only remains available for the insolvencies of large 
complex companies of specific types detailed in the reforms. Crown privilege 
was also abolished and a new regime was introduced wherein a portion of the 
distributions in liquidation were reserved specifically for unsecured creditors.88 
 
The view might be taken that, where the post-Cork IA 1986 had failed in its 
paradigm shift, the IA 2000 and EA 2002 reforms overall, and which will be 
further detailed below, were intended to effectively change the focus of 
insolvency from wealth maximisation for the privileged few towards a true 
collective approach in the form of administration and other rescue-oriented 
procedures, incidentally supporting the further development of the rescue 
culture sweeping legal systems globally. The power of this shift saw many of 
the objections to the contents of the reform process, such as those brought by 
lobbying bodies and organisations such as the British Bankers’ Association, 
simply fail to prevail against the will of government. As a consequence, the 
anticipation was that the reforms would be far-reaching and signal a real 
change, not just to the structure of corporate rescue proceedings, but to the 




The first and perhaps most surprising thing was the disappearance of 
receivership. By dint of wishing to be good Europeans and thus required to 
privilege the cause of collective procedures, the Government announced that 
receivership would no longer be available except in the case of large-scale 
projects and/or financial contracts with a threshold set at a sum which would 
exclude most contracts of lending. As such, administrative receivers can no 
longer be appointed even if a qualifying floating charge is held, unless the 
agreement was entered into prior to the commencement date of the EA 
                                                                                                                                                        
Maxwell, 2011); H. Rajak, Company Rescue and Liquidation (3rd ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2013). 
88 IA 1986, section 176A. 
89 Tribe, above note 30, has a good discussion of the process by which this has occurred. 
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2002.90 As exceptions to the general prohibition, an agreement will be exempt 
if it is in relation to: 
 
 an appointment in pursuance of an agreement forming a capital market 
arrangement;91 
 a public-private partnership project;92 
 a utility project designed for the purpose of a regulated business;93 
 a project company designed to develop land in a disadvantaged area 
(urban regeneration);94 
 a project financed under an agreement in which a debt of at least GBP 
50 million is expected to be incurred;95 
 a company with a “market charge”;96 
 social landlord companies;97 or 
 protected railway companies.98 
 
These seemingly new-found European credentials the Government espoused 
actually hid a darker reality. The real reason was that the Government had 
viewed the banks with a jaundiced eye ever since the beginning of the 1990s, 
when their actions in the midst of the then financial crisis (often precipitated by 
panic and concern for their own financial position), had led to an upsurge in 
the use of receivership. In the Government’s opinion, the moral contagion 
created by the banks had led to the disappearance of a considerable number 
of businesses which might have otherwise benefited from rescue with the 
consequent loss of employment. The fact that the banks had seen, as a result, 
the health of their balance sheets improve, was for the Government 
unacceptable, especially given the inevitable cost of social security benefits 
provided by the State. The fact that receivership was also a procedure that 
was initiated by a single creditor (even if it was the major creditor) added to 
the misgivings of the authorities, despite the lobbying by representative bodies 
keen to impress on the Government the positive benefits for recovery and re-
lending in the economy. Despite the official announcement of the curtailment 
of receivership, creditors did not lose out entirely, as they would obtain, via the 
reforms to administration, the right to nominate the administrator.99 
Furthermore, the interests of secured creditors are taken into account in the 
new hierarchy of administration objectives.100 
 
CVAs Reformed: The Moratorium Effect 
 
The essential framework of the CVA was not really changed by the IA 2000 
reforms, except in small (but important) ways responding to two particular 
                                                     
90 IA 1986, section 72A(1), (4)(a). 
91 Ibid, section 72B. 
92 Ibid, section 72C. 
93 Ibid, section 72D; Schedule 2A, paragraph 10 sets out a list of regulated businesses). 
94 Ibid, section 72DA. 
95 Ibid, section 72E. 
96 Ibid, section 72F. 
97 Ibid, section 72G. 
98 Ibid, section 72GA. 
99 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraphs 14-18. 
100 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 3. 
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problems that had arisen under the IA 1986 paradigm. The first was the effect 
on creditors unknown at the time of the approval of a proposal, who previously 
had retained their rights of action. Following the IA 2000 reforms, they are 
normally bound by the proposal that is adopted.101 Furthermore, the reforms 
resolved the problem of knowing, in case of any disagreement, which of the 
decisions of the meetings of creditors or shareholders took priority. In effect, 
to deal with the lacuna in the old law, the reforms took the position that the 
creditors’ decision would have priority,102 which was thought to enable 
agreement to be reached on a proposal with one obstacle fewer to surmount. 
 
The real impact of the IA 2000 reforms was to introduce a variation of the 
previous CVA model especially targeted to the position of small- and medium-
enterprises (“SMEs”).103 These companies can now benefit from the possibility 
of requesting a moratorium to protect themselves from the actions of their 
creditors for a period of at least 28 days, but with the possibility of an 
extension of up to 2 months.104 Reforms also include a new section that 
makes it an offence to make false representations with a view to obtaining a 
CVA.105 Delinquent directors can be prosecuted where an offence has been 
committed in relation to the obtaining of a CVA with moratorium, which guards 
against the possibility of directors using the benefit of a 28-day grace period 
without there being good cause. Directors who wish to apply for a moratorium 
are also required to apply with the assent of a practitioner and to guarantee 
that the necessary funds will be available for the company’s needs during the 
currency of the procedure.106 
 
The New-Look Administration and the Rise of the Pre-Pack 
 
An enabling provision was provided for in the EA 2002, which creates a new 
section 8 of the IA 1986 applying Schedule B1 containing the new-look 
administration procedure and the powers of administrators. The same 
provision repealed the entirety of Part II of the IA 1986 (the old administration 
provisions). However, and potentially confusingly, Part II is still preserved for 
special administration regimes pertaining to water and sewage companies, 
railway companies, air traffic service companies, public-private partnership 
companies, and building societies, among others. As a whole, if one 
disregards the content of the new-look procedure, which is much more 
complex than previously was the case, administration has not changed in its 
fundamentals, save in two very important respects: the enhanced importance 
of rescue and the appointment of the insolvency practitioner. The tightening 
up of the timetable and introduction of a presumption that procedures should 
                                                     
101 Ibid., Schedule A1, paragraph 37. 
102 Ibid., section 4A(3)-(6), subject to a right of challenge by the members. 
103 Ibid., Schedule A1, which sets out the detail of the new variety of the CVA with threshold 
tests to determine whether companies qualify. It also gives a long and complicated list of 
companies that are excluded from the benefit of the new rules. 
104 Ibid., Schedule A1, paragraph 37. Generally, the moratorium will last until the point 
meetings are held in relation to the approval of any proposal. 
105 Ibid, section 6A. 
106 Ibid., Schedule A1, paragraph 6. 
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last no longer than a year also helps concentrate attention on promoting swift 
and efficient rescues.107 
 
The first great change impacts on the orientation of the procedure and places 
rescue in a more overt way as the principal objective. Paragraph 3 of 
Schedule B1 states expressly that rescue is the primary (and most desirable) 
outcome of the procedure. This can be contrasted with the original 
administration procedure in the IA 1986, which provided for four alternative 
solutions that an insolvency practitioner could choose from as the goal of the 
particular administration procedure. This left each option on a level of equal 
importance – rescuing the company was an equal alternative to providing for a 
better result than in a straight liquidation. The new purpose of administration 
provided for three hierarchical objectives, those being to rescue the company 
as a going concern, and if that is not possible, to achieve a better result than 
would be achieved in liquidation. As such, except where a rescue is not useful 
or the outcome for the creditors is no better than would be the case in 
liquidation, the practitioner is bound to privilege rescue as the option. The use 
of the word “company” as opposed to “business” in this provision is designed 
to deal with concerns over the hive-down process and to make the procedure 
much more attractive to the directors, who would otherwise fear the 
dismantling of their business, as well as incentivise them to act quickly. 
 
As an alternative, in second place, there is the option to improve on the result 
that might be the outcome of liquidation, where a prolonged continuation of 
business is not usually an option. This “enhanced liquidation” is also desirable 
because it avoids an immediate “fire-sale” and the potential loss of value of 
the business or of its assets. Finally, if the first two options were unattainable, 
the administrator could seek to realise property to make distributions to 
secured and/or preferential creditors, in similar fashion to the function of a 
receiver.108 However, the practitioner would need to justify this by reference to 
the collective interest and demonstrate that it would not be irreparably 
damaged by adopting this option. In this light, the emphasis is on the fact that 
the administrator109 should perform his function in the interests of all of the 
company’s creditors,110 which serves to shift the duty to a principal creditor to 
a responsibility to the collective. The reforms also seek to inject greater 
efficiency and rapidity into the process, which is evident from the insertion of 
the specific instruction for an administrator to perform his duties as quickly 
and efficiently as reasonably practicable,111 making this a legal obligation and 
therefore also enforceable as an obligation in practice. The new hierarchy of 
objectives also embeds the primacy of the practitioner as the court is bound to 
consider his professional advice and will not counter this unless exceptional 
grounds exist. 
 
                                                     
107 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraphs 76-78 (which also deal with extensions of time). 
108 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 3(1)(a)-(c); the hierarchy being specified in paragraphs 3(3)-
(4). 
109 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 6. 
110 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 3(2). 
111 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 4. 
 21
The second important change is in the appointments process, which 
previously was under the control of the court and required a petition to be 
brought by either the debtor or a creditor. The reforms introduced the concept 
of the out-of-court appointment and extended this option to the company and 
to some secured creditors. An administrator can be appointed by the holder of 
a qualifying enforceable floating charge,112 as long as a provisional liquidator 
or administrative receiver has not already been appointed.113 A qualifying 
charge must state that the provisions of Schedule B1 apply; purport to 
empower the holder to appoint an administrator over the company; or purport 
to empower the holder to make an appointment that would otherwise be of an 
administrative receiver. Certain conditions attach to limit the definition of a 
qualifying floating charge that, in essence, require the creditor to have security 
over all or substantial parts of the company’s property.114 Once appointed, a 
notice of appointment and other prescribed documents must be filed at the 
court, including a statutory declaration that the person appointing the 
administrator is the holder of a qualifying enforceable floating charge; that the 
appointment was legally made; that the administrator consents to his 
appointment; and that he is of the opinion that the purpose of the 
administration is reasonably likely to be achieved.115 Underpinning creditor 
primacy in the appointments process, in cases where the company itself 
seeks to appoint, the directors are required to notify the secured creditor, who 
has the option then to proffer an alternative person to nominate. In cases of 
disagreement, the court is bound to prefer the creditor’s choice.116 This 
appears to reflect a view that the creditor has particular knowledge of the 
debtor’s financial position and will be more likely to act in the face of the 
directors’ possible inertia. 
 
The possibility of avoiding judicial scrutiny of appointments has also, without 
doubt, facilitated the appointment in the year that followed the reforms, 
especially in the pre-pack context, whose numbers till now have continued to 
increase. The simple aim of a pre-pack is to protect the debtor company by 
avoiding the reputational stigma and the loss of confidence of its contracting 
partners when approaching the threshold of insolvency. In order to achieve a 
turnaround with these protections in place, the practitioner undertakes to put 
together a sale of assets or of the business of the company to a pre-selected 
buyer. The pre-pack in the United Kingdom is based on a process that 
evolved in the United States, referred to as a “stalking horse offer”, which 
refers to an offer or bid designed to test the market prior to a formal auction, 
essentially setting a reserve price for an asset sale. If the assets or business 
are not then sold for more than the offer, the third party making the offer is 
obliged to complete the purchase. In the United Kingdom, it is the practitioner 
and the principal creditor who, together, lead the negotiations with a buyer 
usually identified by the practitioner through his network of contacts. The main 
                                                     
112 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 16. 
113 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 17. 
114 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 14. 
115 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 18. In fact, where necessary, including where the court is 
closed, the filing may even occur by fax, the date of the transmission being treated as 
effective. 
116 Ibid., Schedule B1, paragraph 26. 
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concern is to protect confidence in the debtor and, for listed companies, the 
value of their stocks by avoiding the competition of other creditors, particularly 
unsecured creditors, up to the moment when the contract is signed by the 
purchasing company and approved by the court in an administration 
procedure opened at the last moment and then quickly closed. 
 
The great defect of pre-packs lies in the fact that other creditors (chiefly the 
unsecured ones) are kept out of the way during the process and often know 
nothing of what is happening until such time as the appointment is made of a 
practitioner in the context of the ensuing administration. The facility given to 
the secured creditor to appoint the administrator, usually the same one that 
has acted in the pre-pack, assists in achieving a quick turnaround of sales 
with a high level of confidentiality. However, the question arises as to whether 
or not a sale in this manner risks the potential for a resurgence of the phoenix 
syndrome that evoked such dread prior to the introduction of the IA 1986. Part 
of the solution is found in practice in the responsibility, referred to above, that 
the practitioner owes to the general body of creditors, but, perhaps more 
relevantly, in the importance of the insurance policy to which all practitioners 
are required to subscribe. The other part of the protection for the unsecured 
lies in the JIC’s Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (“SIP 16”), which first 
appeared in 2008 and has been twice revised, the most recent being in 2015. 
It deals with the responsibility of practitioners in the framework of a pre-pack 
sale and sets out key compliance standards. These mandate transparency, 
the public interest and the collective nature of proceedings as being 
necessary concerns practitioners must bear in mind when conducting the 
process.117 
 




The revisions made by the IA 2000 in relation to the CVA and the EA 2002 for 
administration were intended to resolve many of the shortcomings observed in 
the rescue procedures introduced by the IA 1986. While some of these have 
been resolved, the experience overall since the reforms still remains a little 
ambiguous, particularly in the way receiverships continue to survive at the 





While the Government made its intention of making receivership disappear 
perfectly clear, it remains the case that the procedure has not entirely 
vanished from the statute book and has apparently become, particularly in the 
                                                     
117 A copy may be obtained via the R3 website at: 
<https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP%2016%20Version%203
%20Nov%202015.pdf>. 
118 Paul is particularly indebted, in this section, to Dr Alexandra Kastrinou, Senior Lecturer at 
the Nottingham Law School, for the many discussions over coffee that have teased out many 
of the thoughts that are stated here as opinions. 
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wake of the global financial crisis, the tool of choice for creditors who can still 
benefit from it. The fact of the exclusion in relation to pre-EA 2002 contracts 
can be seen in the statistics reflecting the appointments made from 2003 
onwards, although the figures for the period of the recent global financial crisis 
must be taken to contain a high element of cases in which one of the 
exceptions to the general prohibition applies. Part of the statistics must also 
include the use of receivership in the property law context, where 
appointments remain possible. An interesting question, however, about the 
figures is to speculate whether the companies subjected to receiverships at 
the instance of their creditors in the period following 2008 would have 
preferred, it being the case, the option for administration, were it also 
available. More recently, it can be seen that the statistics for the number of 
receiverships shows a drop, which might suggest an important reorientation in 
favour of administration as the principal choice for rescue. To what extent this 
may be despite the creditors’ wishes cannot be known with certainty, although 
a conclusion might be that the statistics still evidence some competition 
between both procedures, but not one that is as clear cut as under the pre-EA 
2002 paradigm. Should further reforms be undertaken? It seems as if, more 
recently, numbers continue to reduce and the procedure is in decline. Perhaps 
the best outcome is to simply leave the procedure where it is and to draw 
attention once more to those procedures that have a true rescue vocation. 
The question does arise, however, as to what type of rescue it is likely to be, 
given that the shape of rescue itself is changing, driven by developments in 
North America. In fact, there is a movement in practice, reflected in the 
literature, towards a reconsideration of the aim of rescue, given that, in the 
United States, there are many procedures that conclude in a sale under 
section 363 of Chapter 11. The idea of rescue has been recently referred to 
as including the recycling of assets in order to return those assets to a state of 
economic productivity, such that others who are better placed might maximise 
the “use-value” of those assets.119 That is a description that could also have 
been used in the context of receivership, where recovery on behalf of the 
creditor, although usually followed by a liquidation of the corporate shell, was 
viewed as contributing to the creditor’s ability to re-use these assets, 





According to the statistics, the impact of the IA 2000 reforms appears to be 
negligible, with only a slight increase evident in 2003, swiftly followed by a 
reduction in numbers until the period immediately after the global financial 
crisis. Recently, the figures again show a drop in the use of the procedure. In 
a manner of speaking, the CVA does not appear to have enjoyed the favour of 
practitioners. There remain a number of criticisms of the CVA that might 
explain this stagnation. CVAs are still not well regarded due to the uncertainty 
surrounding a company’s ability to adhere to the arrangements set by the 
procedure, which may be particularly difficult to eradicate as it goes to the 
                                                     
119 See J. Girgis, “Corporate Reorganisation and the Economic Theory of the Firm”, Chapter 8 
in B. Wessels and P. Omar (eds), Insolvency and Groups of Companies (INSOL Europe, 
2011), pages 108-9, and the references cited in footnotes 1 and 24 of that work. 
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heart of the British connection between debt and guilt. While the rescue 
culture may have been implemented through these new procedures, 
perceptions of insolvency remain tainted with blame and the stigma of 
irresponsibility, making the engendering of trust between opposing creditors 
and debtors under a CVA all that much more difficult. Just as in its pre-reform 
incarnation, the reticence of the creditors faced with a procedure that is 
seemingly controlled by the debtor continues to play a determining role. This 
reticence, which in some cases breaks out in hostility, undermines the view 
that the CVA offers a consensual approach to resolving financial difficulties at 
an early stage. Moreover, the procedure remains quite time consuming as 
well, despite time limits being set for the process. 
 
As a result, CVAs are still viewed as being overly debtor-friendly and inimical 
to creditors, particularly in the event that shareholder challenges under section 
4A of the IA 1986 are successful. Thus while the new administration 
procedure has been taken up with some level of alacrity, the CVA remains 
underused and perceived with suspicion. This explicit preference by creditors 
(and perhaps also debtors) for administration, which, prior to 2003, was the 
only rescue procedure attracting a moratorium, appears to have been 
translated into the new version of the procedure, including the option with 
moratorium designed for SMEs. It is also possible that resort to the CVA is 
considered by debtors at much too late a stage in the process, when 
administration is the only realistic option. Furthermore, the promise of the 
creation of a more flexible procedure for SMEs has not quite been kept, since 
costs of CVAs can, in some instances, rival those of administration. For 
businesses that are especially concerned by a loss of reputation (and value), 
pre-packs have, for some time now, offered a more confidential and 
procedurally flexible alternative. Nonetheless, the statistics continue to show a 
small, but not unimportant, number of procedures, proof perhaps of some 
utility. It may be that the procedure plays a role for debtors who do not enjoy 
the possibility of an upstream restructuring via a scheme of arrangement, but 
are not quite at the stage where administration (whether of the pre-pack 
variety or not) is a necessity. In light of this, the CVA might be seen as a 
procedure that occupies a small, but essential, space in the range of possible 




The big debate in rescue is most certainly in relation to administration and its 
pre-pack variant, particular as far as the vocation and purpose of the 
procedure are concerned. The reforms to this procedure might be seen as 
ambiguous in their purview. On the one hand, the procedure has become 
much more complex. On the other hand, the role of the court in scrutinising 
appointments has been reduced by the new out-of-court appointments 
process and by the increasing role given to practitioners generally, given that 
courts have traditionally maintained an arm’s length approach to the 
supervision of professionals. However, the fact that the practitioner may be 
appointed by a secure creditor, in whose interest he is authorised to act (the 
third purpose of administration) evokes memories of receivership and of the 
period when creditors acted really according to their will. One might ask 
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whether that is really rescue in the 21st century. The problem seems to be 
that the procedure was ambiguous at the outset, since, in 1986, administration 
played a lesser role as compared to receivership and was not as well 
appreciated by creditors, thus leading to the slow burn development of a 
rescue culture. After the IA 2000/EA 2002 reforms, administration has become 
even more of a hybrid: on the one hand, a collective procedure, but, on the 
other, a procedure that can guarantee a determining role to the secured 
creditor and ensure a distribution in its interest. 
 
With pre-packs, the view may be taken that this “schizophrenia” is even more 
pronounced, as the secured creditor plays a role in the procedure, while only 
the presence of the practitioner (and eventual administrator) is supposed to 
guarantee that the collective interest will be taken into account in a procedure 
that takes place largely unknown to the creditors. It is more difficult, though, to 
ask what reforms might be useful here. Perhaps a fresh look could be taken at 
the balance between different creditor interests, though it is difficult to see 
how a reform might serve to create a new equilibrium without alienating the 
secured creditors. Nonetheless, the secured creditors have not always had 
their own way, especially in connection with what happened to receivership. 
As for pre-packs, the profession is aware of continuing concerns and the 
revisions to SIP 16 appear targeted to addressing these. More recently in 
2014, the Graham Report reviewed the operation of pre-packs and largely 
conclude that they were well-managed, though recommendation were of 
course made.120 It also stated that legislation remained an option for the 
Government, perhaps a signal to practice that the revisions to SIP 16 should 
not otherwise be an excuse for relaxing vigilance. In fact, one of its 
recommendations for the use of an independent panel to review offers is 
currently being implemented. 
 




Despite the reforms instituted by the Enterprise Act 2002, controversies that 
arose prior to the new legislation remain and improvements are left to be 
made. In the decade following the reform, practice has not only developed in 
relation to pre-packs, but also in the design of reorganisation driven by the 
developments from the United States and Canada. In light of the challenges 
that have confronted insolvency systems in the UK in the past, what 
challenges are to be expected for the future? There are two in particular that 
appear evident, the parlous state of the law itself and the potential for 
European influence on domestic insolvency.121 
 
The State of the Law 
 
                                                     
120 Graham Review into Prepack Administration (Insolvency Service, June 2014). 
121 A longer list of desirable changes and an incidental plea for a new committee on the model 
of the Cork Committee are set out in J. Tribe, “Crystal Balls and Insolvency: What does the 
Future hold?” (2012) 23 International Company and Commercial Law Review 405. 
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There is a need to contemplate, during any consideration of substantive 
reforms, the shape of the legal text that will embody future reforms. The 
current shape is particularly mediocre and needs much reordering to make it 
clearer and more certain. The reason is that, following the reforms, the rescue 
procedures were contained substantially in the schedules making cross-
referencing to the main Act provisions difficult. The fact that parts of the Act 
are “invisible”, including the repealed Part II of IA 1986 that still applied to 
certain types of undertaking, does not help coherence or clarity. Furthermore, 
much that is important to the practitioner is in the Insolvency Rules 1986, 
which have been undergoing a process of updating in the past few years 
under the aegis of the Insolvency Rules Committee.122 This is because the 
law itself, especially in personal insolvency, authorises extensive rule-making 
to complete the operations of procedures.123 The balance between primary 
and secondary legislation may thus be said not to be where one might expect 
it to be. Overall, the view may be taken that practitioners find it on occasions 
difficult to navigate the labyrinth that is the UK insolvency system. 
 
This is not to mention the need to review the legislation periodically in light of 
changes occurring at European level, particularly with respect to the recent 
replacement of the EIR by a “recast” version in 2015. Future developments in 
this area, detailed below, might add to the pressure for an early review of 
domestic law. In any event, whether future changes are extensive or not, the 
Insolvency Service would do well to institute a regular timetable for the 
revision of insolvency law, such as there apparently exists for company law. 
Given the adoption of a distinct law of corporate insolvency in 1986 and the 
changes occurring at the beginning of the millennium, the law relating to 
insolvency, it would appear, has been the object of revision about every 15 
years. While, such a gap might not be sustainable in current times, particularly 
in light of the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis, more regularity in 
the revision process is to be welcomed. 
 
The European Influence 
 
Even given the shape of current politics in the United Kingdom, the possibility 
of external influence, particularly European, on the domestic legal order is 
never far from the legislator’s mind. The authorities are also conscious of the 
evolution of insolvency frameworks in other European Union member states 
and potential competitor jurisdictions on the economic plane, particularly the 
United States. The need to review domestic laws against a background of 
regulatory arbitrage occurring globally is something of which the Government 
is acutely aware. While the phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage currently 
benefits the United Kingdom, there is no guarantee of the duration of this 
happy state and it is sensible to review laws periodically in order to ensure 
that operators in the business environment continues to have access to 
procedures that are favourable. In that light, the Government reviewed 
domestic law against the recommendations published by the European 
Commission as part of a 2014 text targeting reforms to deal with four 
                                                     
122 Some changes to primary legislation have also been made by the Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (2015 c. 26). 
123 IA 1986, section 322. 
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particular concerns: the availability of a framework to facilitate preventive 
restructuring, assisting restructuring negotiations through enabling the 
appointment of a mediator and for stays to be available, ensuring the success 
of restructuring plans through certain minimum content and clarifying creditor 
and court involvement in the adoption process as well as providing protection 
for new financing arrangements.124 
 
While the Government appeared to be satisfied that domestic law largely 
mapped to the benchmarks set out in the recommendations, the initiative has 
now resulted in the formation by the European Commission of an Experts’ 
Group on Restructuring and Insolvency. The role of the experts in the group, 
which began its work in January 2016, will be, over the course of a 3-year 
period, to assist the Directorate-General Justice and Consumers in the 
formulation of minimum standards for a new and harmonized restructuring 
and insolvency law for the European Union. The proposed law is intended in 
part to address the terms set out in the 2014 Recommendation. As such, the 
remit of the Experts’ Group not only covers the development of common 
principles and rules in the area of preventive restructuring procedures that 
were the subject of the 2014 Recommendation, but also common principles 
and rules in relation to formal insolvency procedures,125 the promotion of 
second chances for honest debtors (natural persons), the qualification of 
insolvency practitioners, the duties and liabilities of directors in insolvency as 
well as measures seeking to reduce costs for SMEs in restructuring and 
insolvency procedures as well as facilitating their access to such procedures. 
In addition, the Experts’ Group will be tasked with ensuring that any common 
principles and rules that are proposed are consonant with the EIR. It seems 
that at the very least these topics will form part of the new programme, 
although it may be difficult to predict the precise direction of all the initiatives 
that may be taken as part of this new programme. Nonetheless, the direction 
of this programme is likely to have an impact on domestic law, which will need 
to be taken into account once the scope and direction of the European texts 
are known. 
 
IX - Conclusions 
 
History has shown that reforms rarely contain all the solutions needed to 
resolve all the problems of a legal system. The work of the Cork Committee, 
however, tried to provide essential changes with the aim of updating the 
insolvency framework and to endorse a system that would be able to respond 
to the requirements of a fluctuating economy. Insolvency practitioners, who 
have come from a number of different professions, have brought extensive 
experience in business as well as pragmatic solutions proven by years of 
practice. This has contributed to the fact that the introduction of the idea of 
rescue was accepted from the beginning as an asset to a modern legal 
                                                     
124 Recommendation on a New European Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency 
(Document COM(2014) 1500 Final) (12 March 2014), at 6-10. See also the INSOL Europe 
Study (12 May 2014) assessing to what extent the member states were already compliant 
with the norms being promoted. 
125 Note Recital 22, Recast EIR, which mentions the need for a review of employment-related 
preferences. 
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system. Nevertheless, the experience of the IA 1986 paradigm, from its 
inception and prior to the reforms, has also demonstrated that competition 
between procedures and the different preferences of participants may lead to 
a diversion from the spirit of rescue intended to imbue the law, with the 
potential consequence that the objectives set might not be achieved at the 
outset. Perhaps all reforms are trial and error, until tempered through the 
experience of practice. 
 
The shift towards a greater emphasis on rescue can be seen, nonetheless, in 
the reforms that were incorporated in the IA 1986 by the combined impact of 
the IA 2000 and EA 2002. Both of these amending acts altered the landscape 
of corporate rescue in the UK by introducing a moratorium for CVAs, giving a 
certain leeway to corporate management to initiate procedures, curtailing the 
use of receivership aimed at privileging the collective nature of rescue and 
preventing the secured creditor from having too much say in his debtor’s fate. 
However, the secured creditor now has an important role to play in 
administration by the power of appointment. Other changes to administration 
have seen the Crown giving up its preference, while unsecured creditors may 
now benefit from the constitution of a small ring-fenced fund dedicated to their 
at least partial repayment. The more recent use of the pre-pack in 
administration has taken the popularity of such methods of rescue to great 
heights, although the reality of periodic financial crises will always mean that 
liquidation is more frequently than not the predominant procedural outcome. 
 
The lessons and challenges that became apparent following the Cork-inspired 
and rescue-oriented insolvency system of the 1980s and which continue to 
prevail in the minds of practitioners, academics and policy-makers are 
numerous: how can an equilibrium be found between the needs of the 
profession for a “light-touch” regulation juxtaposed against the need for the 
protection of consumers and other stakeholders; how can confidence be 
instilled in the system while also continuously taking stock of its efficiency and 
improving it at various appropriate intervals of time; how can procedures best 
be updated in response to changes in practice without causing undue 
disruption and uncertainty in the system as a whole? These challenges 
continue to affect the user-friendliness of insolvency systems and make the 
need for reform all the more apparent as time passes. To that end, it would 
perhaps be advisable to view the task of reform as a continuous project that 
can be constantly progressed in order to pursue an eternal quest to perfect 
the law. When, though, will such reforms take place? It is difficult to say, but it 
does not seem that they are at the moment a priority, short of a volte-face by 
the Government or an external macro-economic event generating a crisis 
requiring a legislative response. Small and targeted reforms are always 
possible, but an extensive and wholesale revision of the statute book does not 
appear likely in the short-term. Nonetheless, this remains a space to watch. 
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